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Abstract:
This paper examines why economies endow agents with a degree of personal privacy,
even when (a) “no privacy” is ex-post (Pareto) eﬃcient, and (b) a costless monitoring
technology exists. A government can provide more of a public good only by identifying
“valuable” agents from a population of n. All agents report their type to the government
— truthfully or not — unsure if they, or others, are being observed. When n is small, it
is shown that increasing monitoring eﬀectiveness can actually lead to ex-post ineﬃciency.
Political equilibria are also characterized, where agents vote to constrain the government’s
monitoring eﬀectivenes but not its ability to levy penalties or rewards. When n is large, all
such equilibria are eﬃcient; however, a utilitarian government may not implement taxes
to reward honest reporting, nor impose penalties to punish it, even when these options
ensure full revelation. Legislating a “right to privacy”, by contrast, is always ineﬃcient.
1Comments are very welcome. Thanks to Robin Boadway, Jonathan Pincus, Alasdair Roberts, Ruqu
Wang, and seminar participants at Queen’s University, 2001 PhD Conference on Business and Economics
at the University of Western Australia, and the 2002 Association for Public Economic Theory conference
for useful suggestions. All errors are my own.1 Introduction
The concept of “privacy” — studied extensively by researchers in many disciplines —
has received relatively little consideration by economic theorists. In its most widely ac-
cepted meaning, privacy refers to the ability of individuals to be alone from the larger
society. This “aloneness” may take a number of forms. To be physically left alone, to
have a sphere of inﬂuence over which one is free from coercion, to have one’s personal
thoughts, characteristics and behaviour remain unknown to the rest of society — all these
are examples of being endowed with privacy. It is widely accepted that individuals desire
a degree of privacy, although many explanations have been given as to why this should
be the case. In most developed nations, privacy laws govern many issues associated with
information gathering, retention and dissemination, for ﬁrms and governments as well as
for individuals. Most of the popular concern with privacy, however, focuses on the ability
of individuals to retain a “private sphere” in the face of intrusion by government agen-
cies and other citizens. Frequently, this means establishing institutions to keep personal
information secret, in the sense that it cannot be accessed by other groups or individuals
in society.
Political, sociological and legal scholars have noted an increasing popular concern
with privacy, which has coincided with technological advances in electronic record-keeping,
computing power and monitoring technologies. Consider, for example, the advent of DNA
testing, video surveillance, electronic databases and so-called Smart-Cards. According to
Lyon (2001), these new forms of surveillance are advocated “for eﬃciency or public order”
although their secondary eﬀect is to “destabilize the public/private boundary” between
individuals and society. Privacy issues have received attention both in the workplace
(Connerley et. al, 1999, Gilliom, 1997) and in the home (Crabb, 1999). However, most
emphasis in these ﬁelds has dealt with privacy as a “right” or an intrinsic “freedom”. For
example, Brin (1998) and Garﬁnkel (2000) argue that the surveillance of behaviour and
characteristics should be controlled to preserve democratic objectives. Implicit in their
arguments is the view that privacy is an inherently valuable primary good, as opposed to
a feature of the economic environment which aﬀects welfare via outcomes.
Why might individuals and governments be concerned about observing the private be-
haviour and personal characteristics of other members in society? For individuals, others’
information may be valuable in itself (as in the case of “nosy preferences”, where indi-
viduals obtain utility from knowing the behaviour or consumption of others), or it may
provide strategic beneﬁts (for example, knowing the characteristics of competitors for
employment may allow individuals to better tailor their own applications). Governments
seek individuals’ information for a variety of reasons, usually to improve the eﬀective-
1ness of public transfer policies (e.g. welfare, UI) and to eﬃciently allocate government
expenditures (e.g. via information gathered by a census).
The existence of some degree of privacy is tacitly acknowledged in the massive liter-
ature on adverse selection and moral hazard problems. In an early paper on this issue
Posner (1981) conjectured that the institution of worker-applicant privacy hurts the eﬃ-
ciency of labour markets by allowing inferior employees to hide bad characteristics from
potential employers. This paper departs from previous work by focusing on the origins of
asymmetric information rather than optimal policies in this environment. For instance, a
fundamental problem in public ﬁnance is to determine optimal policies to implement when
certain information is not observable by the government. It is rarely if ever asked why
such information is unobservable, especially when full information almost always leads to
greater eﬃciency in the Pareto sense. That is, full information on individual types ex-
pands the set of eﬃcient feasible allocations that can be implemented by policy-makers.
Consequently, there appears to be a tension between the degree to which individuals
may hide their personal information and economic eﬃciency. Is this always the case? If
not, it may be beneﬁcial for a benevolent government not to have full information about
individuals’ types even when it is feasible to do so.
This paper has two goals. The ﬁrst purpose is normative: to investigate the nature
of the trade-oﬀ between privacy and welfare, using a simple model where two individuals
must simultaneously choose whether to report their true characteristics to a government
that monitors all agents with some probability. These characteristics are used directly
in the production of a public good. One group in the economy (“high types”) have
valuable information, while the other group (“low types”) do not. When revealing valuable
information — whether truthfully or after being observed by the government — is costly,
high type agents have an incentive to free-ride on the revealed information of other high
types. However, this incentive is tempered by their desire for the public good and inability
to directly observe the types of others. It is shown that although full information (zero
privacy) and no monitoring (full privacy) can both lead to eﬃcient outcomes, a unique
equilibrium can exist for intermediate levels of monitoring which guarantees ineﬃciency.
Therefore it is not the case that increased monitoring (reduced privacy) leads to greater
welfare.
The second purpose of the paper is positive: to endogenously determine what amount
of leeway agents will give the government to observe their types, given the government’s
endogenous desire to observe. The model outlined above is extended by letting the number
of agents become large and adding two prior stages to the reporting game. First, after
learning their types, agents are given the power to vote on a binding level of monitoring
to which they will be subjected; second, a welfare-maximizing government is given the
2option to levy ﬁnes and set transfers between individuals after they commit to a certain
level of monitoring. The objective here is not to replicate an actual political process, but
rather to model a situation where governments are constrained (for example, legally) from
observing citizens to whatever extent they wish. In this setting, many political equilibria
are possible, but two are striking. Even though high type agents have “something to hide”,
they may vote to eliminate privacy in order to capture all other high types’ information
and compel the government to provide compensation. And even though low type agents
have “nothing to hide”, they may vote for less than full privacy and allow some high
types to escape being monitored, so as not to subsidize compensation for all high types.
Returning to the normative issue, it is shown that if high types ever prefer some monitoring
to none, then a “right to privacy” is always ineﬃcient even though voluntary contribution
of information is allowed at all times.
The model in this paper borrows elements from several existing literatures in public
economics and political economy. The structure of individuals’ behaviour is similar to
that of the literature on tax evasion (eg. Allingham and Sandmo (1972), Beck, Davis and
Jung (2000), Boadway and Sato, (2000), Chander and Wilde (1998)), in which agents
submit true or false reports subject to a probability of audit, and receive a reward or
penalty based on their honesty or deception. The nature of the monitoring technology
is similar to the “tagging technologies” studied by Akerlof (1978) and Parsons (1996),
in which direct identiﬁcation of individual’s types improve the eﬃciency of government
transfer schemes to approach full information outcomes. This paper departs from these
studies by adding strategic behaviour with other individuals via public good provision,
and by assuming costless monitoring. Elsewhere, Konrad (2001) has written speciﬁcally
on the issue of privacy. He shows that when the government cannot commit ex ante to
limit its observation of individuals’ characteristics ex post, restricting the government’s
ability to collect information about individuals may be Pareto-improving. This paper, by
contrast, allows individuals to restrict the monitoring available to the government as part
of a political equilibrium.
There is also a literature on the desirability or feasibility of targeting individuals as
a means to improve economic allocations. Targeting may be too costly relative to its
beneﬁts (Besley (1990), Jacquet and van der Linden (2001)), or politically unsupportable
(DeDonder and Hindriks (1998)). The relationship between targeting and privacy is
summarized by Lindbeck (1988):
A basic reason why privacy is threatened by far-reaching welfare state policy
... is that such policies, if they include high marginal tax and transfer rates,
may make honesty towards the state quite “expensive” for the individual be-
cause of the gains from giving incorrect information in connection to taxes
3and public beneﬁts ... The government will therefore be induced to build
up an elaborate system of information of the lives of individuals and private
organizations. (311-312)
Of course there is an alternative to a control state, namely to accept slack in
the system, in the sense that a considerable amount of cheating with taxes,
breaking of regulations and misuse of beneﬁts are accepted by the authorities
... Obviously, democratic societies tend to opt for some combination of control
and slack. (314, original emphasis) 1
The model outlined in the following sections — that of treating private information
as an input to a public good — is used to consider the question of what degree of “slack”
emerges from the model, and why.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 presents
some solutions to in a two-agent setting, while Section 4 extends the model to n-agents.
The choice of monitoring in a political equilibrium is addressed in Section 5. Section 6
concludes.
2 The basic model
The model used is a variant of a voluntary contribution mechanism. Individuals of two
distinct types simultaneously contribute to a government-collected pool of information
used to produce a public good. By reporting their types, truthfully or otherwise, they
make a claim about their usefulness in producing the public good. However, agents are
exposed to a given monitoring technology when reporting their type. The following is an
outline of the basic economic setting.
Environment: There are n agents (indexed by j = 1...n) and a central agency (gov-
ernment). The agents are divided into two types, “high” and “low”, so agents may be
of type i ∈ {H,L}. Assume that each agent has an ex ante probability of being type H
with probability α, and type L with probability (1 − α). When n is large, this implies
that the ex post distribution of types is (H,L;α,1 − α) and n = nH + nL. Assume that
α is common knowledge to all actors in the economy.2 Each agent is endowed with equal
economic resources, Y .
1A recent example pertains to the department of human resources in the Canadian government
(HRDC), which under public pressure was forced to destroy a longitudinal database containing a large
set of personal information on Canadian citizens. Almost simultaneously, the department was criticized
for its ineﬃcient allocation of federal grants and poor record-keeping, problems which could ostensibly be
remedied through improved targeting of beneﬁts based on personal and ﬁrm characteristics. Thus, while
individuals were concerned with their own privacy, they were also concerned with ineﬃciencies that their
personal information could help alleviate. (This example was suggested by Alasdair Roberts).
2This assumption is maintained for simplicity, but could be relaxed to allow for a richer set of predic-
tions from the model.
4Preferences: Each type of agent i, i ∈ {H,L} has preferences over a public good, G,
and a composite private good, x: ui(G,xi). Assume that u is twice diﬀerentiable in each





(x,G). That is, high types like the public good relatively more than low types.
Public Good: The public good is produced according to the following technology:
G = F(˜ nH) (1)
where
˜ nH = (# of high types observed by the government) , ˜ nH ≤ nH
Let F0(·) > 0 and F00(·) ≤ 0. In words, more of the public good can be produced when
more high type agents are identiﬁed, but at a declining rate. Only by identifying high
types can the production of G be increased.3 Upon being identiﬁed, each high
type pays a compliance cost, c ≥ 0, of which a portion β accrues to the government for
production of G.
Mechanism with Monitoring: Assume that each agent’s type is his or her private
information, unobservable to other agents or to the government. The mechanism put in
place by the government takes the following form:
1. There exists a costless4 monitoring technology which can identify an agent’s true
type with known probability m ∈ [0,1]. (At this stage, assume that the particular
technology has been predetermined.) m is known to the government and all agents.
2. Agents simultaneously submit a type report ˆ H or ˆ L to the government. This report
can be diﬀerent from the agent’s true type, H or L.
3. The government observes true types according to m and checks its observations
with the reports. If they agree, the government does nothing. If they disagree, the
government levies a penalty p ≥ 0 on each agent j who misrepresents himself. A
high type agent caught cheating pays the compliance cost c as well as the penalty
p.
4. Allocations are made and utilities are determined.
3This speciﬁcation allows the amount of public good to be non-zero when no high types are identiﬁed:
e.g. G = ¯ G + f(˜ nH).
4The assumption of costlessness is used to simplify the analysis. Costly monitoring is also omitted
to eliminate outcomes where privacy is chosen simply because monitoring technologies are prohibitively
expensive. However, improvements in technology, especially in the realm of electronic surveillance, suggest
that many techniques can gather alot of information about individuals for little cost. e.g. consider hidden
video-surveillance, or computer algorithms able to scan email, etc. (see Lyon, 2001).
5It is immediate that low types (L) will always report ˆ L to the government. To see
this, note that low types are incapable of adding to the public good, and would only incur
a penalty if caught reporting ˆ H.
Monitoring ability is used as a proxy for the level of privacy that agents enjoy: lower
monitoring implies greater privacy. Readers may object that when m > 0 there is an
a priori case for the elimination of privacy.5 Alternatively, m may be considered one
measure of “slack” observed in public policy. Monitoring has two opposite incentive eﬀects
for high types in this model. First, increased monitoring encourages these individuals to
report their true information despite compliance costs, given the threat of punishment
if they are found to be misrepresenting themselves. Second, increased monitoring raises
the chance that other individuals will be forced to submit their true information, raising
the incentive to a given individual to withhold her true information and save compliance
costs.
Note that an observed high type must pay c either voluntarily or if caught cheating.
This cost may be seen as a time cost of participating in a survey or study, the inherent
cost of relinquishing a piece of personal information, or simply as a monetary fee levied
against high type individuals. This deﬁnition follows that of Besley (1990). βc is the
amount of useful resources — expressed in monetary (or private good) terms — that the
government can obtain from each high type agent it can identify.6 High types reporting
untruthfully but caught by the monitoring system are indistinguishable from low types,
and so do not incur these costs.
Several examples can provide intuition for this model. These include:
• The public good is to ﬁnd a cure for a genetic disease. High types carry a predispo-
sition for the disease, which can be identiﬁed with a simple DNA test. If discovered,
high types must submit to medical study or testing regimen which is costly from
their perspective but increases the probability of ﬁnding a cure.
• The public good is a reduction in violent crime. High types are law abiding cit-
izens who own guns, but the government proposes a registry to track guns which
are resold, stolen, and used in crimes. With access to purchasing records, the gov-
ernment could identify gun owners. Gun owners — if discovered — must ﬁll out
5Any threat that one’s actions are being observed could be construed as an invasion of privacy. In the
present context, the government announces the level of monitoring m to those potentially being observed.
Coupled with a public scheme for punishing those who misrepresent themselves, this mechanism allows
agents to compute their expected payoﬀs from diﬀerent reporting strategies.
6Implicitly, the amount (1 − β)c is a deadweight loss to society for a “found” high type. Such a loss
is analogous to studies of tax evasion in which costly auditing is needed to identify cheaters (e.g. Beck,
Davis & Jung, 2000), although here the costs are borne by monitored agents, not the government. The
exact level of β does not aﬀect any qualitative results of the paper.
6lengthy forms to register their guns, be subject to inspection, and participate in
safety classes.
• The public good is the success of a sports team. High type players like to consume
alcohol and stay up late, while low types do not. If high types stay in and don’t
drink, the team will do better but they will personally suﬀer a utility cost equal to
c from abstaining. The coach monitors players’ behaviour after hours to identify
these high types.
This model is applicable to other scenarios as well. Governments evaluate projects
based on the characteristics of those who stand to principally beneﬁt from them. Aca-
demic studies typically require identiﬁcation of research subjects to increase their eﬃcacy.
And government programs can become more eﬃcient as certain population subgroups are
identiﬁed (as in the tagging and targeting literatures), freeing up resources for other uses.
3 The Model with Two Agents
The purpose of this section is to examine the tradeoﬀ between the degree of privacy enjoyed
by agents, and the eﬃciency of the outcomes generated in the mechanism described above.
Because n = 2 is small, the ex post distribution of types need not be (H,L;α,1 − α); in
general it will be [(H,H),(H,L),(L,H),(L,L);α2,α(1−α),(1−α)α,(1−α)2]. A relevant
question is then to ask, “how much monitoring is needed to ensure an eﬃcient outcome?”
In a setting where agents must decide to reveal or withhold their true information, unsure
of (a) the information held by other agents and (b) whether they are being monitored or
not, the answer to this question is unclear. This section will provide basic intuition for
the n agent case.
Given the assumptions of the previous section, and the straightforward behaviour of
low types, the set of possible allocations for an agent can be characterized. For every low
type agent, this set is (Y,F(˜ nH)), where Y is the agent’s endowment. For every high type
agent j, the set of possible allocations is given by (Y − cj − pj,F(˜ nH)), where cj = c if
agent j truthfully reports ˆ H — or if j reports ˆ L and is caught lying — and 0 otherwise.
Also, pj = p if agent j is caught reporting ˆ L and 0 otherwise.
Deﬁne x = Y and x = Y − c. With two players, there are two possible allocations for
low types: (x,Gm), (x,Gl) and six for high types: (x,Gm), (x,Gl), (x,Gh), (x,Gm) and
(x − p,Gh), (x − p,Gm), where h,m,l denote “high”, “medium” and “low”. To clarify,
Gh = F(2), Gm = F(1) and Gl = F(0).
Utilities from these allocations are ranked according to:
uL(x,Gm) > uL(x,Gl)
7uH(x,Gm) > uH(x,Gh) > uH(x,Gm) > uH(x,Gl)
uH(x − p,Gh) > uH(x − p,Gm)
Both high and low types prefer having a high level of the private good and a medium
level of the public good to all other alternatives. Nothing is assumed about the relative
rankings of outcomes for high types where a penalty is assessed, except that they converge
to the “no penalty” payoﬀs as p tends to 0.
Eﬃciency is determined in this setting by the Pareto criterion: an outcome is eﬃcient
if it is not possible for one agent to be made better oﬀ without reducing the other agent’s
welfare. An equilibrium of the above game is ex post eﬃcient if it is Pareto eﬃcient
following the (possibly hypothetical) revelation of each agent’s type.
The (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium concept is used to ﬁnd equilibria. This criterion
requires agents to play their best strategies for each possible type they may have, con-
tingent on the Nash strategies played by other agents and the distribution over types.
To simplify the analysis, suppose that α = 1/2. When the probability of being each
type is equal and independently drawn for each agent, the joint distribution of types is
[(H,H),(H,L),(L,H),(L,L); 1/4,1/4,1/4,1/4]. This distribution is maintained for the
extent of this section. The strategy set for each agent is the set of their possible type-
reports, high or low, given their type, high or low. It has been established that low types
will always report ˆ L. Thus, for i = 1,2, the strategies are (Report ˆ H or ˆ L given type
is H, Report ˆ L given type is L), or in shorthand: ( ˆ Hˆ L),(ˆ Lˆ L). The equilibrium concept
involves calculating the best responses of each player to his opponent’s possible strategies.
3.1 Full Privacy (m = 0)
With no monitoring, agents are free to report their types without fear of punishment
should they misrepresent themselves to the government. Although low types report ˆ L, a
high-type may also report ˆ L. If he does so, and his opponent reports ˆ H, he will receive
uH(x,Gm), where Gm = F(1).
To illustrate, consider the expected payoﬀ to a high type agent of playing ˆ H, contingent
on his opponent playing ( ˆ Hˆ L). This payoﬀ is given by:
EUH( ˆ H| ˆ Hˆ L) =
1
2











Equivalently, one can ﬁnd EUH(ˆ L| ˆ H ˆ L), EUL( ˆ H|ˆ Lˆ L) and EUL(ˆ L|ˆ Lˆ L), and use these
values to determine the best responses of a high type to his opponent’s possible type-
8contingent strategies (recall that low types always have the best response ˆ L). Proceeding
in this manner to ﬁnd Nash equilibria, we arrive at the following conclusions:
Remark 1: (1) If uH(x,Gh) + uH(x,Gm) > uH(x,Gm) + uH(x,Gl), reporting ˆ H for
type H is a dominant strategy. The unique equilibrium is ( ˆ H ˆ L, ˆ H ˆ L) — the “truth telling”
case — and all outcomes are ex post eﬃcient. (2) If uH(x,Gh)+uH(x,Gm) < uH(x,Gm)+
uH(x,Gl), there are two pure strategy equilibria — ( ˆ Hˆ L, ˆ Lˆ L) and (ˆ Lˆ L, ˆ Hˆ L) — and one
mixed strategy equilibrium where each agent randomizes over ( ˆ H ˆ L) and (ˆ Lˆ L). Not all
equilibria are ex post eﬃcient.
When both agents report truthfully as in (1) of the remark, the ex post set of outcomes
are
1. uH(x,Gh) for each if the types are (H,H).
2. uL(x,Gl) for each if the types are (L,L).
3. uH(x,Gm) and uL(x,Gm) if the types are (H,L).
Examining the rankings of payoﬀs indicates that no other feasible allocations are Pareto
superior than those obtained in this simple mechanism. Note also that truth-telling gives
the high type a relatively low level of utility when his opponent turns out to be a low
type. Case (2) of the Remark 1 is the interesting case for the purposes of analysis, since
the ex post outcomes can produce ineﬃciency. Here the outcomes from pure strategies
are
1. uH(x,Gm) for one agent and uH(x,Gm) for the other if the types are (H,H).
2. uL(x,Gl) for each if the types are (L,L).
3. uH(x,Gm) for the high-type agent and uL(x,Gm) for the low-type or uH(x,Gl) for
the high-type and uL(x,Gl) for the low if the types are (H,L).
Situations 1. and 2. here generate eﬃcient outcomes. Situation 3. (when there is one
agent of each type) generates an ineﬃcient outcome when the high type agent plays (ˆ Lˆ L)
and the low type plays ( ˆ Hˆ L). In this case, welfare could be improved by compelling the
high type to report truthfully, thereby raising G. Note also the distributional consequences
of situation 1. Although each agent turns out to be identically a high type, one contributes
his true information while the other does not. In this equilibrium, one agent always ends
up misrepresenting.
9The mixed strategy equilibrium is characterized by agents playing the strategy ( ˆ Hˆ L)
with probability q and (ˆ Lˆ L) with probability (1 − q), where q is deﬁned by,
q =
2[uH(x,Gm) − uH(x,Gl)]
uH(x,Gm) + uH(x,Gm) − uH(x,Gh) − uH(x,Gl)
. (2)
q ∈ (0,1) when situation (2) holds. The mixed strategy concept does not proscribe a
certain outcome, but rather allows many eﬃcient and ineﬃcient outcomes to occur with
probabilities dependent on q. For instance, consider the strategy-proﬁle (ˆ Lˆ L, ˆ Lˆ L) which
would be expected to occur with probability (1 −q)2. If the ex-post distribution of types
is (H,H), each player receives payoﬀ uH(x,Gl), the lowest ranked welfare level ex post.
The inability of pure privacy to guarantee fully eﬃcient outcomes encourages one to
ask: can reductions in privacy, construed as increased monitoring, increase the likelihood
of eﬃcient outcomes? The answer to this question is given in the following section. As it
happens, if the penalty is not set too high, there exists an interesting pattern of behaviour
as the level of monitoring increases. Here, increased monitoring can actually guarantee
ex post ineﬃciency when one or both of the players are high types.
3.2 Monitoring (0 < m ≤ 1)
As described above, the government now monitors agents and informs them that they are
subject to a monitoring technology which can detect their true type with probability m.
Again, attention can be restricted to the strategies ( ˆ Hˆ L) and (ˆ Lˆ L), since no low-type
agent ever has an incentive to receive the allocation attainable by reporting himself as a
high type. Now, however, the expected payoﬀs to the agents also depend upon m and p.
Consider the expected payoﬀ to an agent of playing (ˆ Lˆ L) given that his opponent also
plays (ˆ Lˆ L). With probability 1
4 = 1
2 × 1
2, both agents are high-types and their strategies
specify that they should each lie about their type. In this case, the payoﬀ to an agent
following such a strategy is:
EUH(ˆ L|ˆ L;(H,H)) = m2uH(x − p,Gh) + m(1 − m)uH(x − p,Gm) +
m(1 − m)uH(x,GM) + (1 − m)2uH(x,Gl)
The ﬁrst term in the above expression represents the allocation obtained when both agents
are monitored and caught. Here, each agent pays the penalty7, p, and is forced to pay
compliance cost c. However, the highest value of G is produced, Gh = F(2). The second
term represents the allocation when the agent in question is monitored but the other is
7I assume that the penalty is discarded after its collection; i.e. it is not returned to the agents. This
assumption is reconsidered in section 6.
10not, and the third term the allocation when the agent in question is not monitored but
his competitor is. With probability (1−m)2, neither agent is monitored, and the outcome
is that where each agent retains his private information but little of the public good is
provided. By calculating the payoﬀs obtainable under every possible joint distribution of
types, given the strategies played, the equilibria of this game are obtained.
An indepth description of the calculation of equilibria is omitted here. However, high
type agents’ behaviour can be characterized as follows. The report ˆ H is a best response
to ( ˆ Hˆ L) if:
R(m) ≡ [uH(x,Gm) + uH(x,Gl) − uH(x − p,Gh) − uH(x − p,Gm)]m −
[uH(x,Gm) + uH(x,Gl) − uH(x,Gh) − uH(x,Gm)] ≥ 0 (3)
Given p, R(m) is an increasing linear function in m, with R(0) < 0 and R(1) ≥ 0, with
equality if p = 0. Deﬁne ˙ m such that R( ˙ m) = 0. Then (ˆ Lˆ L) is a best response to ( ˆ Hˆ L)
for all m < ˙ m. The report ˆ H is a best response to (ˆ Lˆ L) if:
S(m) ≡ [uH(x,Gm) + uH(x − p,Gm) − uH(x − p,Gh) − uH(x,Gl)]m2
[uH(x,Gh) + 3uH(x,Gl) − uH(x,Gm) − uH(x,Gm) − 2uH(x − p,Gm)]m
+2[uH(x,Gm) − uH(x,Gl)] ≥ 0 (4)
Notice that S(m) attains a unique minimum if uH(x,Gm) + uH(x − p,Gm) > uH(x −
p,Gh)+uH(x,Gl). If so, call this minimum ˘ m. Since S(0) > 0 and S(1) > 0, if S(˘ m) ≤ 0
for some m ∈ (0,1), and because S(m) is quadratic in m, then there exist values of m,
m0 ≤ m00, such that (ˆ Lˆ L) is a best response to ( ˆ Hˆ L) for all m ∈ (m0,m00). Figure 1
illustrates the shapes of R(m) and S(m).
The equilibria to the game with monitoring are characterized in the following set of
remarks:
Remark 2: When m = 1 (full monitoring or “no privacy”), each agent has a dominant
strategy to report his true type for any p ≥ 0.8 Thus, the unique equilibrium is ( ˆ Hˆ L, ˆ Hˆ L),
and this outcome is ex post eﬃcient.
Remark 3: Let S(˘ m) ≤ 0 with m0 ≤ m00 and m0 < ˙ m. Then (1) For m ∈ [0,m0], the
equilibria are ( ˆ Hˆ L, ˆ Lˆ L), (ˆ Lˆ L, ˆ Hˆ L) and one mixed N.E. (2) For m ∈ (m0,min{ ˙ m,m00}), the
unique equilibrium is (ˆ Lˆ L, ˆ Lˆ L). (3) For m ∈ [min{ ˙ m,m00}, max{ ˙ m,m00}), the equilibria
8In fact, there may exist some parameter values which sustain non-truthtelling equilibria for p = 0.
These equilibria are eliminated by assuming that an agent plays ( ˆ H ˆ L) no matter what his opponent plays
when he is indiﬀerent between ( ˆ H ˆ L) and (ˆ Lˆ L).
11are ( ˆ Hˆ L, ˆ Lˆ L), (ˆ Lˆ L, ˆ Hˆ L) and one mixed N.E. (4) For m ∈ [max{ ˙ m, m00},1], the unique
equilibrium is ( ˆ H ˆ L, ˆ Hˆ L). Several of these outcomes are ex post ineﬃcient, and in situation
(2), all outcomes where there is at least one high type in the game are ex post ineﬃcient.9
Remark 2 simply states that when agents are sure of being monitored they will never
lie about their types. Thus, consider the polar cases of m = 0 and m = 1, maintaining
the assumption that uH(x,Gh) + uH(x,Gm) < uH(x,Gm) + uH(x,Gl). When m = 0,
full privacy holds, and ineﬃciency occurs in some equilibria. When m = 1, there is no
privacy, but eﬃciency is guaranteed.
Remark 3 points out that eﬃcient outcomes are not necessarily more plausible as the
level of monitoring rises. The intuition behind this result is as follows. Suppose agents are
named A and B, and now consider the problem from agent A’s perspective, where A is a
high type. A knows that B will also be a high type with probability 1
2. When B uses the
strategy (ˆ Lˆ L) and m = 0, A’s best response is to play ˆ H (see Remark 1). Now suppose
m were to steadily increase. m0 — if it exists — is the level of m at which it becomes
a best response for A to play ˆ L given that B plays (ˆ Lˆ L). Why should such a threshold
level of m exist? Essentially, A’s selﬁsh motive is to retain his private information while
maximizing the level of G. But as m rises, the probability that a “high-type” B will
be caught while playing (ˆ Lˆ L) increases, and when B is caught he is forced to contribute
to G. At some point, it is possible that this incentive causes A to submit to the same
possibility of getting caught, meaning that after m0 is reached he will play ˆ L given that B
is playing (ˆ Lˆ L). But suppose m rises further still. We know that at m = 1, ˆ H becomes a
dominant strategy for A. If m0 exists, then m00 ≥ m0 is the level of monitoring at which
A again chooses to play ˆ H given that B plays (ˆ Lˆ L). Intuitively, a level of m exists where
the threat of being caught when playing ˆ L for A is too great; i.e. the possible loss from
being caught outweighs the possible gain from a “high type” B being caught and paying
towards G.
The threshold level ˙ m refers to the level of m such that agent A will begin playing ˆ H
as a best response to B using the strategy ( ˆ H ˆ L). When m = 0, A will use ˆ L as a best
response in pure strategies: since a “high type” A stands no chance of being caught, he
can attain a high level of utility by lying in the case where his opponent is also a high
type and tells the truth. As m rises, the chance of being caught rises and A’s gain from
misrepresentation falls. Thus, ˙ m is the level of monitoring at which truth-telling ( ˆ H)
becomes a best response to B’s truth-telling ( ˆ Hˆ L).
These two eﬀects combine to produce diﬀerent equilibria at diﬀerent levels of m, espe-
9The mixed-strategy equilibrium is deﬁned by the level of q(m) which equates q(m)EU(HL|HL) +
(1 − q(m))EU( ˆ H ˆ L|ˆ Lˆ L) = q(m)EU(ˆ Lˆ L| ˆ H ˆ L) + (1 − q(m))EU(ˆ Lˆ L|ˆ Lˆ L).
12cially when there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in high types’ utility between the allocations
(x,Gm) and (x,Gh). This is a case where compliance costs are high, and Gl = F(0) is
very low. Consider the following example (which lists only the utility to high-types since
equilibrium payoﬀs to low-types’ utilities are irrelevant in the calculation):
Example 1 Let uH(x,Gm) = 13, uH(x,Gh) = 5, uH(x,Gm) = 4, uH(x,Gl) = 3,
uH(x − p,Gh) = 4 and uH(x − p,Gm) = 3. Then the following threshold values obtain:
m0 = 1/3, m00 = 2/3, ˙ m = 7/9. The equilibrium outcomes are:
( ˆ H ˆ L, ˆ Lˆ L) and (ˆ Lˆ L, ˆ Hˆ L) and 1 mixed ⇐⇒ m ∈ [0,1/3]
(ˆ Lˆ L, ˆ Lˆ L) ⇐⇒ m ∈ (1/3,2/3)
( ˆ H ˆ L, ˆ Lˆ L) and (ˆ Lˆ L, ˆ Hˆ L) and 1 mixed ⇐⇒ m ∈ [2/3,7/9)
( ˆ H ˆ L, ˆ Hˆ L) ⇐⇒ m ∈ [7/9,1]
It is clear to see that this mechanism guarantees eﬃciency only for levels of monitoring
above 7/9. Indeed, for “moderate” levels of m such as 1/2, the only equilibrium is that
where both agents misrepresent themselves when they are high-types. In this case, the
only guaranteed ex-post eﬃcient situation is that where both agents are low types; when
they are both high types, each agent receives an allocation based on whether they or their
opponent is monitored. Figure 1 is drawn using the numbers from this example.
Being monitored and caught is never eﬃcient, even though monitoring is costless.
Because agents who are caught must pay a ﬁne and report their true type, they could
have done better by telling the truth to begin with. Decreasing p decreases the slope
of R(m) and “ﬂattens” S(m). To illustrate, consider example 1, but with p = 0; that
is, uH(x − p,Gm) = uH(x,Gm) = 4 and uH(x − p,Gh) = uH(x,Gh) = 5. In this case,
˙ m = 1, while m0 = 0.22 and m00 = 1. These parameter values indicate a wider range
of monitoring values which sustain the “worst” outcome at (ˆ Lˆ L, ˆ Lˆ L), indicating that the
penalty makes misrepresentation more unattractive for high types. The issue of what
penalty might be levied in this sort of game is examined in the next section. One result
there is that a benevolent government may not wish to ensure full compliance with strict
penalties.
Example 1 required high type agents to place a very high value on the public good. If
the G is not as valuable relative to x, or compliance costs are small, high type agents are
less likely to risk misrepresenting themselves:
Example 2 Let uH(x,Gm) = 12, uH(x,Gh) = 5, uH(x,Gm) = 4, uH(x,Gm) = 3,
uH(x − p,Gh) = 4 and uH(x − p,Gm) = 3. Then the following threshold values obtain:
13m0 = m00 = 1/2, ˙ m = 3/4. The equilibrium outcomes are:
( ˆ H ˆ L, ˆ Lˆ L) and (ˆ Lˆ L, ˆ Hˆ L) and 1 mixed ⇐⇒ m ∈ [0,1/2)
(ˆ Lˆ L, ˆ Lˆ L) ⇐⇒ m = 1/2
( ˆ H ˆ L, ˆ Lˆ L) and (ˆ Lˆ L, ˆ Hˆ L) and 1 mixed ⇐⇒ m ∈ (1/2,3/4)
( ˆ H ˆ L, ˆ Hˆ L) ⇐⇒ m ∈ [3/4,1]
If all other parameter values are maintained, but uH(x,Gm) is dropped to 11, ˙ m becomes
5/7, but m0 and m00 cease to exist since S(m) never dips below 0 for any m. That is,
there is no level of monitoring for which a high type agent may be induced to report ˆ L,
given that his opponent is using the strategy (ˆ Lˆ L).
3.3 Other Results
3.3.1 Cheap Talk Between Agents
An important result to note is that pre-play communication in this game does not aﬀect
the equilibria. That is, if agents have access to a costless signal with which they can inform
their opponent of their type (ie. “cheap talk”), then the equilibrium from this signalling
process is “babbling” in that it conveys no relevant information (as in Morris (2001)).
Suppose that agents can simply announce their types to each other before making their
type-announcement to the government. Then it can be shown that all agents have a weakly
dominant strategy to announce that they are low types. In this case, the announcement
stage does not change agents’ beliefs about their opponents’ types and so does not change
the reports made to the government.
3.3.2 Three Agents
If n = 3, the nature of agents’ play is changed because there is now an additional potential
contributor to the public good/aggregate information set. A high-type third agent can
potentially add to the stock of G and increase the incumbent agents’ utilities and possibly
his own as well. If the incumbents were both low types, this would be an unambiguous
welfare improvement. However, it is uncertain whether such welfare improving cases will
occur. For example, suppose that there is a two-agent game, with both agents being high-
types ex post and m being such that ( ˆ H ˆ L, ˆ Lˆ L) is the unique equilibrium of the mechanism.
If a third player were added, ( ˆ Hˆ L) might be the best response to her opponents’ strategies
( ˆ Hˆ L, ˆ Lˆ L). To maintain the equilibrium ( ˆ H ˆ L, ˆ Lˆ L, ˆ Hˆ L) — which would give agents 1 and
2 the same xi regardless 3’s of type, and greater G if 3 turns out to be a high type —
14it must also be the case that (ˆ Lˆ L) is a best response to ( ˆ H ˆ L, ˆ Hˆ L) for agent 2 (agent 1’s
problem is symmetric to that of agent 3). Whether this is the case depends upon the level
of m and the way in which G enters agents’ utilities. In general, it can be shown that
truth-telling equilibria more unlikely in the three-player case — that is, for a given p, m
must be higher to induce all agents to tell the truth. Intuitively, high type agents prefer
to misrepresent themselves as the number of total agents rises, to take advantage of the
fact that others may be caught and compelled to contribute to G.
4 The Model with n Agents
Individual behaviour in the type-reporting game depends on the total number of other
individuals subject to the monitoring mechanism. This result follows because every agent
cares about others’ actions through the amount of G eventually provided. As monitoring
increases, one blunt eﬀect is simply to force more high type individuals to contribute
the public good by directly observing their types. However, depending on the penalty,
increasing m may reduce the tendency of high types to report truthfully and simply “take
their chances” under m. Since the level of m is a rough substitute to the number of high
types who voluntarily report ˆ H, high type agents may be encouraged to “free-ride” on
others’ information if p is not too great.
The n-player model is constructed as follows. First, assume that n is large, so that
a measure m of individuals are monitored and (1 − m) are not. For the same reasons
as given above, low type agents always report ˆ L in equilibrium. High type agents, may
report either ˆ H or ˆ L in equilibrium. Let q ∈ [0,1] be the probability that a high type agent
reports ˆ H as part of a mixed strategy, or equivalently, since n is large, the proportion
of high types who play ˆ H as a pure strategy. The derivation of q in equilibrium will be
clariﬁed below. Also, since n is large, the ex ante and ex post distributions of types are
identical: {(H,L);α,(1 − α)}.
The total amount of the public good provided ex post, as a function of (q,m) is:
G(q,m) = F(˜ nH)
= F(αnq + αn(1 − q)m)
= F(αn[m + q(1 − m)]) (5)
Each (q,m) pair deﬁnes a (potentially non-unique) level of G. For example,
G(0,m) = F(αnm) (6)
15and
G(1,m) = Gmax = F(αn) (7)
The latter value of G is independent of m since all high type agents contribute βc whether
they are monitored or not. However, m is taken as given, whereas q is determined as a
consequence of equilibrium play.
Consider the problem of any high-type agent facing n − 1 other agents, where n is
large. Deﬁne the equilibrium proportion of high-type agents playing ˆ H (or equivalently,
the mixed-strategy probability of all high type agents playing ˆ H) by q∗(m,p) ∈ [0,1].
Then, the choice problem of a high type agent is to report either ˆ H or ˆ L according to the
rule EUH(ˆ L,q,m) Q EUH( ˆ H,q,m), or,
(1 − m)uH(F(α(n − 1)[m + q(1 − m)]),Y ) +
muH(F((α(n − 1)[m + q(1 − m)]) + 1),Y − c − p)
Q uH(F((α(n − 1)[m + q(1 − m)]) + 1),Y − c)
In shorthand notation, this becomes
(1 − m)uH(Gl(q,m),x) + muH(Gh(q,m),x − p) Q uH(Gh(q,m),x) (8)
where “l” and “h” indicate “low” and “high” amounts of G, for any given (q,m) pair.
Expression (8) is the best-response rule for a high-type agent when facing a proportion q
of other high types reporting truthfully. If m = 1, it is clearly a best-response to report ˆ H
regardless of others’ actions. Otherwise, the equilibrium proportion of truth-telling high
type agents is q∗(m,p), since, when q is viewed as a mixed strategy, this level ensures
EUH(ˆ L,q∗(m,p),m) = EUH( ˆ H,q∗(m,p),m).
Under certain forms of preferences, one can solve explicitly for q∗(m,p). Here, prefer-
ences of the form ui(G,x) = biln(G) + v(x) are used, where v(·) is an increasing concave
function and bH > bL.
When preferences take this form, and m ∈ [0,1),
Gl(q∗,m)
Gh(q∗,m)





[v(x) − mv(x − p) − (1 − m)v(x)]
)
(9)
When h(m,p) ≥ 1, it must be that all high types are “honest” (q∗ = 1). Given p, there
will always be such a value of m ∈ [0,1). To see this, note that h(m,p) > 0 for all
m ∈ [0,1), but h(m,p) ≥ 1 for some values of m in this range as well. When this case
16occurs, there is no value of q for which Gl
Gh = h(m,p). Speciﬁcally, h(˜ m,p) = 1 where
˜ m =
v(x) − v(x)
v(x) − v(x − p)
(10)
Clearly, 0 < ˜ m ≤ 1. Since it can be shown that h0(m,p) > 0 for all m, there exists a
˜ m such that h(m,p) ≥ 1 for all m ≥ ˜ m. In this range, reporting ˆ H is always a best
response, regardless of other agents’ actions. Thus, truthful revelation is guaranteed as
an equilibrium given any level of m > 0 by imposing a suﬃciently high ﬁne, p.10 Lastly,
h(m,p) reaches a minimum either if m = 0 or p = 0; call this hmin. That is,









Equilibrium play requires optimal behaviour from high type agents. There are three
possibilities in equilibrium:
1. All high types report ˆ H so q∗(m,p) = 1.
2. All high types report ˆ L so q∗(m,p) = 0.
3. A proportion q∗(m,p) ∈ (0,1) report ˆ H and (1−q∗(m,p)) report ˆ L, or, equivalently,
all high types report ˆ H with probability q∗(m,p).11
Analogous to the two-agent model, the interesting case for analysis is that where some
high-type agents do not report truthfully. Assume therefore that h(m,p) < 1. This
assumption rules out the case where p is set suﬃciently high to ensure truth-telling by
high-type agents. For simplicity, assume also that
F(˜ nH) = (βc[αn(m + q(1 − m))])δ (12)
where δ ∈ (0,1] describes the public-good productivity of identifying additional high type












10This condition is not necessary to induce a truth-telling equilibrium for all agents, but it is suﬃcient.
i.e. For a given p there can exist a m0 < ˜ m for which q∗(m0,p) = 1.
11Again, this equivalence depends on n being large, a diﬀerence from the two player case.
17For it to be an equilibrium proportion of high-type agents reporting ˆ H, q∗(m,p) ∈ [0,1].
Letting the RHS of (13) vary with m, however, the calculated value of q(m,p) can also be
negative or greater than one. In the former case, set q∗(m,p) = 0 (no high types report
ˆ H) and in the latter, set q∗(m,p) = 1 (all high types report ˆ H).
This setting ensures that some proportion of high types will reveal voluntarily even
when m = 0, as in the standard case where G is provided privately. To see this, note that









However, the reader should note that although h(0,p) = h(m,0), it is not the case that
q∗(0,p) = q∗(m,0). As will be seen in the next section, it is quite possible that even
though q∗(0,p) > 0, q∗(m,0) = 0.
Remark 4 For future reference, it is useful to note the comparative statics of q∗(m,p).
Speciﬁcally, ∂q∗/∂n < 0, ∂q∗/∂α < 0 and ∂q∗/∂h(m) > 0 always. As the number of
agents in the economy rises, ceteris paribus, the tendency in equilibrium for high types to
report truthfully falls. Similarly, the tendency for high types to report truthfully rises as
the function h(m) increases in value. Since ∂h(m,p)/∂p > 0, ∂q∗(m,p)/∂p > 0: higher
penalties induce more truth-telling in equilibrium. However, the sign of ∂q∗(m,p)/∂m is
ambiguous in general. Depending on other parameters, and the shapes of v(·) and F(·),
higher levels of monitoring can either increase or decrease the equilibrium proportion
of high types who tell the truth. Essentially, this reﬂects the dual incentive eﬀects of
monitoring: it increases the private-good cost of cheating due to a greater chance of being
caught, but increases the level of G by increasing the number of cheaters who are caught.
To this point, nothing has been said about how m and p are determined; rather, only the
agents’ behaviour given these parameters has been analyzed. The next section analyzes
what level of m will be chosen, as well as what levels of penalties and transfers will obtain
under this model.
5 Monitoring and Policy Choice
Consider the following game in an economy with n agents of equal endowments Y , α of
whom are high types (H) and (1−α) of whom are low types (L). As in the previous section,
preferences take the form ui(xi,G) = biln(G) + v(xi), with bH > bL. The government
provides (ex post) an amount of the public good G = (βc˜ nH)δ where δ ∈ (0,1] describes
18the productivity of high types’ information. Given the potentially low level of public
good provided with no monitoring (m = 0), described by equation (14), the government
proposes the introduction of a monitoring scheme to identify high types directly:
Stage 1: Agents vote in a referendum in which they indicate their preferred level of
monitoring, m ∈ [0,1]. All monitoring technologies are feasible and costless, and the
government implements the level of m which has the plurality. The results of the vote
become common knowledge.
Stage 2: Given m, the government announces a level of penalty, p ∈ [0,Y ] for agents it
ﬁnds to be misrepresenting their type. It also sets a transfer of TH to high type agents
reporting ˆ H whether they are monitored or not. Call this a “reward”. To ﬁnance the
reward, a tax payment, TL, is levied on all non-monitored agents who report ˆ L and on
monitored low type agents, who always report ˆ L.12 Transfers can be either positive or
negative. Denote the policy vector as τ = (TH,TL,p).
Stage 3: With the monitoring system in place, agents make their reports to the govern-
ment. The behaviour of agents is characterized by the analysis of the preceding section,
except now the government’s set of instruments is expanded to τ from simply p.
The (subgame perfect) equilibria of this game can be found by solving the game
backwards in the conventional manner:






[v(x − TH) − mv(x − p) − (1 − m)v(x − TL)]
)
(15)
and the equilibrium proportion of high-type agents reporting truthfully, q∗(m;τ) ∈ [0,1],
is given by (13). The threshold value of m, ˜ m, inducing truthful revelation (for which
h(m,τ) ≥ 1) is,
˜ m =
v(x − TL) − v(x − TH)
v(x − TL) − v(x − p)
(16)
12This is analogous to Akerlof’s (1978) choice of diﬀerent consumption levels dependent on acquiring a
“tag”. Here, the tags are “high type, cheater”, “high type, not a cheater”, “high or low type, reporting
ˆ L”.




1 + α(n − 1)m
¶
(17)
must hold to ensure q∗ = 0. Since the right hand side of (17) approaches 1 as n grows
large, the range of m for which q(m,τ) ∈ (0,1) becomes very small away from m = 0. For
this reason, the focus below is on government policies which set either q∗ = 0 or q∗ = 1.
Stage 2: Following Parsons (1996), the government is benevolent, and sets τ to maxi-
mize the sum of ex post utilities weighted by the proportion of each group in the popu-
lation13 :
Ugov = αn[q(m;τ)uH(G(q(m;τ),m),x − TH) +
(1 − q(m;τ))muH(G(q(m;τ),m),x − p) +
(1 − q(m;τ))(1 − m)uH(G(q(m;τ),m),x − TL)] +
(1 − α)nuL(G(q(m;τ),m),x − TL) (18)
subject to budget balance,
αnq(m;τ)TH + [αn(1 − m)(1 − q(m;τ)) + (1 − α)n]TL + m(1 − q(m;τ))p = 0 (19)
In this formulation, the government cares only about the ﬁnal welfare of each agent,
independent of their previous behaviour. Since the government anticipates the play of
agents in the next stage (as given by q(m,τ)), it can usually induce q∗ = 0 or q∗ = 1 with
a certain set of policy, τ. The play of the agents then determines the level of G. The set
of policies generating q∗(m;τ) ∈ (0,1) are less easily observed due to the recursive nature
of the solution: in stage 3, q(m,τ(q)) via (15). A solution (q∗,τ∗) with 0 < q∗ < 1 — if
it exists— is the ﬁxed point of such a calculation.
Three relevant policy options exist for the government given the instruments at its
13The assumption of benevolence means that the government maximizes a function of agents’ utilities.
The inclusion of all agents utilities in the objective function may be seen as problematic: ie. why would
the government care about the welfare of cheaters? There is a literature in which the government may
exclude certain characteristics from compensation since they are seen as the agents’ responsibility (see
e.g. Fleurbaey and Maniquet (1999) and Roemer (1998)). In one sense, this is a benchmark case; the
government could maximize (18) by excluding the utilities of the (1 − q) high types who cheat. Since
the government can inﬂuence the degree of cheating (i.e. q(m;τ)), it could set policies to increase q to
one, thus increasing its own objective. However, doing so would alter the objective of the government
signiﬁcantly — it would be concerned not just with welfare broadly deﬁned, but also with eliminating
cheating for its own sake. Alternatively, one could interpret (18) as that objective when the government
cannot commit to a more stringent welfare measure. Confronted with a choice of m from stage 1, the
government cannot help but maximize all agents’ utilities in stage 2.
20disposal:
1. Set TH = TL = p = 0. Call this policy M.
2. Set p = 0, and TH, TL as determined by (19). Call this policy T.
3. Set p > 0, and TH = TL = 0. Call this policy P.
Each of these policies can be examined in turn. The government will then choose, given
m, the policy that maximizes (18).
Policy M If the government does nothing, G(0,m) = F(αn[m+q(1−m)]), with q(m;0).
“Cheating” high types are not penalized beyond having to pay their compliance costs, c.
Policy T (19) can be rearranged as:
TH = −
[1 − α(m + q(1 − m))]
αq
TL = −ωTL (20)
Suppose the government were to maximize (18) for an arbitrary q. Then the ﬁrst order
condition is:
αqωuH
x (x + ωTL) = α(1 − q)(1 − m)uH
x (x − TL) + (1 − α)uL
x(x − TL) (21)
When uH
x = uL
x = v0(x), (21) rearranges to the condition:
v0(x + ωTL) = v0(x − TL). (22)
Solving for TL yields,
TL(q) =
αqc
1 − αm(1 − q)
(23)
The government can naively set a tax based on what it expects q to be in Stage 3.
However, given any q it desires, it sets v(Y −c+ωTL) = v(Y −TL) > v(Y −c), no matter
what q is eventually played. But by (8), even with p = 0, a high type agent will never
report ˆ L. Thus, a solution (q∗,T ∗
L) of the government’s choice is to set TL(q = 1) = αc.
Indeed, this is what the government would choose if types were perfectly observable. Note
that p is redundant in any case when a tax/transfer scheme is in place, hence p = 0 is a
valid conjecture. This policy results in the highest possible value of Gmax = F(αn), and
spreads the burden of compliance costs across the society. It is also invariant to the level
of m selected in stage 1.
21Policy P Instead of a tax/transfer scheme, the government might choose to apply a
penalty, p, on monitored high types reporting ˆ L. From the deﬁnition of h(m;τ), the
government can always set p suﬃciently high to implement q∗ = 1 in stage 3, given m,
but then it will never be collected. Alternatively, depending on the choice of m, it may
set a penalty suﬃciently low to set q∗ = 0 in stage 3. But by inspection of (18), if m > 0
and q∗ = 0, the government would never choose such a penalty, since it would only reduce
the utility of monitored high types reporting ˆ L. Similarly, suppose the government set
p to induce 0 < q∗ < 1 with the proceeds transferred equally to all other agents. With
m > 0, this policy would be identical to the tax transfer scheme in which case p is again
redundant. Thus, if p > 0, it must be high enough to force q∗ = 1. Then Gmax = F(αn),
but the compliance costs are borne entirely by high types.
Stage 1: Suppose that all agents are asked to vote in a secret ballot as to the level of
monitoring which should be implemented in this setting. This ballot is essentially blank,
with each agent writing in his preferred level of monitoring.14 Suppose further that the
m implemented is that level which obtains a plurality of votes. Since it is the case that all
high types and all low types vote in the same way, respectively, then the winning level of
m is simply the preferred level of the type that is in the majority (ie. the median voter).
Agents of each type anticipate the best response of the government to various levels of
m and vote for that which brings their type the highest expected utility. Which policy
is chosen depends on several parameters in the economy, including α, F(·), (Y − c) and
n (via G). The government’s choice between a tax/transfer scheme and a penalty on
cheaters is invariant to m, however. Thus, it is always feasible for the government to
make the agents’ choice of m redundant.
5.1 Equilibria in Monitoring and Policy Choice
It has already been shown that the introduction of a tax/transfer scheme — for any level
of m chosen in the ﬁrst stage — produces q∗ = 1. Also, a benevolent government will
never impose a penalty which leads to q∗ < 1. An ambiguity remains in the case where
no policy tools beyond m are used (τ = (0,0,0)). However, by inspection of (11), (15)
and (17), this means h(m,τ) = hmin < 1 and if n is suﬃciently large, q∗(m;0) ∈ (0,1)
14Of course, one can think of many alternate mechanisms for choosing the level of monitoring. A
simple alternative, for example, might include the government naming a level of m, and asking agents to
vote “yes” or “no” on that level, with the alternative being the absence of a monitoring technology (full
privacy). In this case, the government would be more able to implement its preferred level of monitoring
by oﬀering a majority of the agents better welfare levels than they would obtain in the full privacy case. If
agents do not know their types when casting their ballots, it is reasonable to assume that their preferences
would be exactly those of the government, in which case stage 1 would be redundant.
22only for levels of m equal to and approaching zero. Assuming that q∗ = 0 for all m > 0
permits a more straightforward analysis of expected payoﬀs to agents and the government
for levels of m > 0. Deﬁne an equilibrium of this game as the triplet (m∗, Policy{M,P
or T},q∗).
With preferences speciﬁed as above, and the condition that q∗(m;0) = 0 for m > 0,
the payoﬀs from the three policy regimes (M,P,T) can be deﬁned.
High Types: Under each policy, the Stage 1 payoﬀs for a high type agent are:
UH
M = mv(Y − c) + (1 − m)v(Y ) + bH ln(G(0,m))
UH
T = v(Y − αc) + bH ln(Gmax)
UH
P = v(Y − c) + bH ln(Gmax) (24)
Low Types: Under each policy, the Stage 1 payoﬀs for a low type agent are:
UL
M = v(Y ) + bL ln(G(0,m))
UL
T = v(Y − αc) + bL ln(Gmax)
UL
P = v(Y ) + bL ln(Gmax) (25)




M = [(1 − αm)v(Y ) + αmv(Y − c) + [αbH + (1 − α)bL]ln(G(0,m))]n
U
gov
T = [v(Y − αc) + [αbH + (1 − α)bL]ln(Gmax)]n
U
gov
P = [αv(Y − c) + (1 − α)v(Y ) + [αbH + (1 − α)bL]ln(Gmax)]n (26)
Lemma 1: (a) The penalty scheme, P, is never preferred by high type agents, (b) P is
always preferred by low type agents, (c) P is never preferred by the government.
These results are intuitive. Low types would always prefer a penalty to a tax since in
the former case they receive Gmax without bearing any private costs. They also bear no
private costs under a monitoring scheme, but receive more G under the penalty scheme.
High types always prefer a tax scheme to a penalty since they will report truthfully under
each scheme, but will be compensated for some of their compliance costs under the former.
It may be the case that UH
P ≥ UH
M over some ranges of m. However, it follows from Lemma
1 that if UH
M ≥ UH
T for some range of m, then UH
M > UH
P over this range by the transitive
property.
235.1.1 The Government’s Response to m
Lemma 1 ensures that there will be no equilibrium in which a penalty scheme is used.




P , since this pairwise
ranking will not aﬀect how the government chooses between M and T. The general rule
for comparing the tax scheme with the monitoring scheme for the government is the










[αbH + (1 − α)bL)] > (1 − αm)v(Y ) + αmv(Y − c) − v(Y − αc) (27)
Given m, the left hand side of (27) represents the additional amount of G obtainable from
moving to a tax scheme (under which q∗ = 1), whereas the right hand side is the extra
private beneﬁt from retaining a monitoring scheme only. This leads to a second result:
Lemma 2: With q∗ = 0, there always exists a level of m < 1, ˆ m, such that the govern-
ment prefers a tax scheme to a monitoring scheme for all m > ˆ m.
Lemma 2 states that the government always has a best response to choose scheme T if
agents choose a suﬃciently high m in stage 1. However, note that (27) does not rule out




M (m) for all m. In this scenario, the government always chooses
to implement scheme T in stage 2 regardless of what m is chosen in stage 1. If such is the
case, then there is no voting equilibrium in m since the ﬁnal allocations will be invariant
to the choice of m. This result holds no matter which type is in the majority.




M (m) for all m, the set of equilibria of the monitoring/policy
choice game is (m∗ ∈ [0,1],T,q∗ = 1).
The complementary case is that where the government prefers M to T over some range
of m. Note that the function U
gov
M (m) is hump-shaped with respect to m.15 Denote
as ˜ mgov the value of m which maximizes U
gov
M (m). Then if U
gov





M (m) > U
gov
T for some range of m around ˜ mgov. Due to Lemma 2, there will be some
upper bound to this range, given by ˆ m.
15This may be observed by taking ﬁrst and second derivatives — if a certain level of m solves the ﬁrst
order condition, then it is a maximum since the second order condition is non-positive.
245.1.2 Agents’ Voting Behaviour
In the ﬁrst stage, the agents must anticipate the government’s best policy action in the
second stage when voting. All high type agents vote the same, as do all low type agents.
Thus, the winning level of m is that of the majority group, determined by α, the proportion
of high types.
High Types in the Majority: (α > 1/2) UH
M(m) is also a hump-shaped curve, at-
taining a maximum at ˜ mH. High types will vote for the speciﬁc level of monitoring
that maximizes UH
M(m), conditional on (a) UH
M(˜ mH) > UH
T and (b) U
gov
M (˜ mH) > U
gov
T .
Fortunately, the following lemmas establish that condition (a) implies condition (b).
Lemma 3: ˜ mgov > ˜ mH.
Lemma 4: If UH
M(˜ mH) > UH
T for some m ∈ [0,1), then U
gov




M(˜ mH) < UH
T does not necessarily imply U
gov
M (˜ mgov) < U
gov
T .
Lemma 4 states that if high types ever prefer M to T, the government will also prefer
M to T at the level preferred by high types. Thus, high types will vote for ˜ mH when
UH
M(˜ mH) > UH
T . However, the additional result is that even if high types never prefer M
to T, it is possible that the government does over some range of m. Thus, in equilibrium,
high types will never vote for m in such a range if they themselves always prefer T to M.
Remark 6: Given U
gov
M (˜ mgov) > U
gov
T and α > 1/2, (a) If UH
M(˜ mH) > UH
T , the
unique equilibrium of the monitoring/policy choice game is (m∗ = ˜ mH,M,q∗ = 0).
(b) If UH
M(˜ mH) < UH
T , the set of equilibria of the monitoring/policy choice game is
(m∗ = {m ∈ [0,1] such that U
gov
M (m) < U
gov
T },T,q∗ = 1).
Low Types in the Majority: (α < 1/2) From (25), observe that UL
M(m) is a strictly
increasing function in m. Lemma 1 established that low types would always prefer a
penalty scheme as government policy, but that the government would never want such a
scheme when a tax/transfer scheme is available. Indeed, from Lemma 2, the government
will always implement scheme T if m is suﬃciently high. Thus, the voting behaviour of
low types is governed by choosing a level of m, ˜ mL, which maximizes UL
M(m) conditional
on (a) UL
M(˜ mL) > UL
T and (b) U
gov
M (˜ mL) > U
gov
T . The following lemma establishes that
any m satisfying condition (b) also satisﬁes condition (a).
25Lemma 5: If U
gov
M (m) > U
gov





T for some m does not necessarily imply U
gov
M (m) > U
gov
T .
Low types’ voting behaviour is governed by the following remark:
Remark 7: Given U
gov
M (˜ mgov) > U
gov
T and α < 1/2, the equilibrium of the monitor-
ing/policy choice game is (m∗ = ˜ mL = ˆ m,M,q∗ = 0).
Recall from Lemma 2 that ˆ m is the highest level of m at which the government still prefers
M to T. Given that U
gov
M (˜ mgov) > U
gov
T for ˜ mgov ∈ (0,1), 0 < ˜ mgov ≤ ˆ m < 1. Thus,
even when low types are in the majority, the equilibrium outcome will generate m∗ < 1.
This result is surprising, since low types themselves have nothing valuable to hide under
a monitoring scheme. It is informative to examine some cases by example.
Example 3: Let Y = 5, c = 3, α = 0.4, β = 0.2, n = 100, bH = 0.3, bL = 0.2.
Also let v(x) =
√
x and F(·) =
√
·. Under scheme M, ˜ mgov = 0.36 (U
gov
M (0.36) = 237).
Under scheme T, U
gov
T = 233 while UL
T = 2.26. Low types vote for ˜ mL = ˆ m = 0.78,
above which the government would switch to a tax scheme. Ironically, UH
M(˜ mH) < UH
T
for this example, implying that high types here would actually prefer a tax scheme to any
monitoring level. See Figure 2.
Example 4: Assume the same parameters as above, except α = 0.6 so that high types
are in the majority. Under scheme M, ˜ mgov = 0.25 (U
gov
M (0.25) = 239), while ˜ mH = 0.18
(UH
M(0.18) = 2.36). Under scheme T, U
gov
T = 225 while UH
T = 2.32. But because the
government prefers M to T for 0.05 < m < 0.85, the high types freely select their preferred
level of m and so m∗ = 0.18. See Figure 3.
Example 5: Again, assume the same parameters as in example 4, except with α = 0.6,
Y = 7 and bH = 0.5. High types are again in the majority. Under scheme M, ˜ mgov = 0.42
(U
gov
M (0.42) = 302), while ˜ mH = 0.37 (UH
M(0.37) = 3.07). However, under scheme T,
U
gov
T = 297 and UH
T = 316. Thus, high types always prefer T to M, although for
m ∈ [0.25,0.8], the government does not. Therefore, m∗ ∈ [0,0.25) ∪ (0.8,1], and scheme
T is implemented. The low types in this example would have preferred ˆ m = 0.8. See
Figure 4.
Examples can also be constructed for which full privacy is chosen endogenously in the
model. Typically, this result requires a public good function such as G = ¯ G + f(·).
265.2 Welfare
The level of monitoring chosen by agents and the policy chosen by the government aﬀect
the relative beneﬁts of high and low type agents. For example, suppose low type agents
are in the majority and vote for a high level of monitoring (but less than unity). It may
be the case that high type agents would prefer scheme T at this level of m, although a
switch to a lower level of m or to scheme T would make low types worse oﬀ. In this
sense, all outcomes of the monitoring/policy choice game are interim Pareto eﬃcient, i.e.,
from the perspective where agents know their types but not the exact outcome of the
mechanism. Under scheme M, with q∗ = 0, a proportion m of high types will be caught
and receive v(Y −c)+bH ln(G(0,m)) ex post. Clearly these agents would have preferred
to report honestly in stage 3 of the game, but rationally chose to take their chances under
the monitoring mechanism, given their type.
Notably, the interim ineﬃcient outcomes which exist in the model are for levels of mon-
itoring below ˜ mH under scheme M, when UH
M(˜ mH) > UH
T . These levels of m will never
be implemented in equilibrium, although one can imagine cases where legal restrictions
prevent the introduction of a monitoring scheme and set m = 0 (with q∗ > 0 but small).
In other words, if high types ever prefer some monitoring to none, a “right to privacy” is
never eﬃcient even though it allows for voluntary reporting. Combining Lemmas 4 and 5,
UH
M(˜ mH) > UH
T implies UL
M(˜ mH) > UL
T . Thus, reducing m below ˜ mH creates a situation
where all agents prefer more monitoring to less at the interim stage when they know their
types. This observation shows that the introduction of an imperfect monitoring scheme
may be Pareto superior to the absence of any monitoring scheme with only voluntary
contributions. Levels of m > ˜ mH are preferred by both the government (see Lemma 3)
and low types, but implementing this level of monitoring can only harm high types under
policy M. These diﬀerences in preferences over m reﬂect the observed tension between
citizens and the government with respect to private information and the government’s
policies for gathering it.
Finally, note the welfare consequences which would result if agents were asked to vote
over m at the ex ante stage, i.e. when agents did not know their types, but only α. In this
case their preferences would be identical to those of the government, and the outcomes
would reﬂect the government’s desires from stage 2 of the game above. We may then
view ˜ mgov as the optimal level of monitoring ex ante, as well as the optimal level from
the government’s perspective. As shown above, this level is diﬀerent from that of both
high and low types, meaning that when stage 1 is included the monitoring level chosen is
always suboptimal for the government.
275.3 Extension: Diﬀerent Valuation of G
To this point, it has been assumed that high types prefer the public good relatively
more than low types. In the present model, this condition means that bH > bL. One
can think of situations where such an assumption is unreasonable: consider the case
of “deviant” behaviour by high types where G represents a measure of public safety or
ambiance. For instance, suppose that high type agents have the tendency to dump used
paint down their drains, polluting local waterways. These agents may care to an extent
about environmental quality, but not to the same extent as low type agents, who do not
dump paint. The government may consider implementing a monitoring technology to
identify the “dumpers” and thus increase the level of G. Under a policy such as M, these
agents may be forced to take their used paint to a recycling center; under a policy such as
T, the government may set up a program to collect paints for free from people who come
forward, by taxing those who do not use the program.
Suppose then that bL > bH ≥ 0. It can be veriﬁed that Lemmas 1-3 are unaﬀected
by this change, but that Lemmas 4-5 cease to hold with certainty. Thus, for example, it
is not the case that if high types ever prefer policy M to T that the government will as
well. Because their preference for the public good holds less weight in the government’s
objective, the government will be more likely to prefer the same policies as do low-types
— namely, greater compliance and contribution to G. Thus, voting equilibria over m will
change when high types are in the majority.
As an extreme case, suppose that high types have no preference for the public good,
bH = 0. It is easy to see in this case that high types will always prefer m = 0, with no
tax/transfer scheme, since this structure guarantees such agents the payoﬀ v(Y ). The
government’s utility from a monitoring scheme is:
U
gov
M = [(1 − αm)v(Y ) + αmv(Y − c) + (1 − α)bL ln(G(0,m))]n (28)
and from a tax/transfer scheme is:
U
gov
T = [v(Y − αc) + (1 − α)bL ln(Gmax)]n (29)
Note that if bH = 0, high types will never contribute voluntarily even if m = 0, so
q∗ = 0 for this level of m. If G(q,m) = G(0,0) = 0, then both the government and
low types receive arbitrarily low utility from the “full privacy” case that would result if
high types were in the majority. In this case, it may be necessary for high types to be
extra-compensated (above Y ) for truthful reporting.
In cases where bH is signiﬁcantly less than bL, but still positive, the government’s
28best policy response is unclear. The shape of the public good technology, F(·), and
the value of α may matter a great deal. Two polar examples illustrate the intuition.
Suppose high types litter, and α > 1/2. Then the government (and high types) may
prefer a very small amount of monitoring of this behaviour, because capturing everyone
who litters imposes many costs without major beneﬁts. Conversely, suppose high types
are sex oﬀenders and α is very small. Then the government (and low types) will prefer a
very high amount of monitoring, since leaving even a few sexual oﬀenders uncaught may
impose small compliance costs relative to the larger public beneﬁt.
6 Concluding Remarks
The model outlined in this paper provides some intuition about the relationship between
privacy, monitoring and welfare. When the number of agents is small, this simple model
shows how perfect levels of monitoring are not necessary to guarantee ex post eﬃciency,
but that privacy can lead to ineﬃcient outcomes. These ineﬃciencies occur because, ex
post, the distribution of agents may be such that each agent would have been better oﬀ
playing a diﬀerent strategy. In some cases, only very high levels of m may guarantee
eﬃciency even though some eﬃcient equilibria exist at lower levels. As m rises, so does
the probability that agents’ types (information) are revealed and contributions are made
to G. But such cases may be “worse” than simple truth-telling if cheating high-types
must pay a penalty of p.
When n is large, the ex post ineﬃciencies due to skewed ex post distributions of
agents’ types are eliminated, since on average the distribution of types (α,1−α) is stable.
Changes in the level of monitoring often help one group and hurt another, exemplifying
the tradeoﬀ implicit in privacy issues. From the government’s perspective, agents choose
either too much and too little privacy. However, it is not necessarily the case that high type
individuals want more privacy and low type individuals want less. When the government
can control redistribution and penalties, a range of equilibria are possible.
As in the earlier quote, the model can generate a rationale behind “slack” frequently
observed in government policy. When monitoring is less than perfect, a portion of the
population can cheat and not be caught. This behaviour is accepted by the government,
since full compliance would bring too few beneﬁts for the costs it generates. Notably, full
compliance may not be optimal for the government even when its costs can be spread
socially. However, such an outcome can be generated when agents vote for a high level of
monitoring before the government decision is made.
This paper also answers the question: why might not all agents agree to agree to either
zero or full privacy? The answer given here is that an incentive exists for individuals
29with valuable information to submit false reports when monitoring is imperfect. In the
model, individuals are unconcerned with privacy for its own sake. However, more complex
behaviour likely generates the demand for privacy and the way it enters into welfare.
The present analysis has abstracted away from a number of features, including dynamic
concerns (conﬁdentiality), non-benevolent government, and errors in monitoring ability.
These issues are likely also important to the privacy issue in economics.
Appendix: Proofs
Lemma 1: (a) It suﬃces to ﬁnd a policy instrument that is always preferred to P.
Clearly UH
T > UH
P since v(Y − αc) > v(Y − c). (b) UL
P > UL
T since v(Y ) > v(Y − αc).
UL
P > UL
M since Gmax ≥ G(0,m) for all m ≤ 1, by deﬁnition. Thus P is always preferred.










M (1) always. Observe that (1 − αm)v(Y ) + αmv(Y − c) is decreasing
monotonically in m, and that v(Y ) > v(Y − αc). Thus, there exists a monitoring level,
ˇ m ∈ (0,1), such that v(Y − αc) = (1 − αˇ m)v(Y ) + αˇ mv(Y − c). Levels of m ≥ ˇ m




M (m), since the LHS of (27) is positive by
deﬁnition.
Lemma 3: From the ﬁrst order condition of maximizing UH
M(m), ˜ mH must satisfy:
v(Y ) − v(Y − c) =
bHG0(0, ˜ mH)
(G(0, ˜ mH)
while ˜ mgov must satisfy:




















G0(0, ˜ mgov) >
G(0, ˜ m
H)
G(0, ˜ mgov). If ˜ mH > ˜ mgov, the RHS of this expression must be greater
than one, and the LHS must be less than one, due to the properties of F(·). But then the
inequality cannot hold. Therefore, ˜ mgov > ˜ mH.
Lemma 4: From Lemma 3, we know that ˜ mgov and ˜ mH take diﬀerent values. From
(24), we know that if UH
M(˜ mH) > UH
T , then
˜ mHv(Y − c) + (1 − ˜ mH)v(Y ) + bH ln(G(0, ˜ mH)) = v(Y − αc) + bH ln(Gmax) + Ω
where Ω > 0. Suppose that, towards establishing a contradiction, U
gov




(1 − α˜ mH)v(Y ) + α˜ mHv(Y − c) + [αbH + (1 − α)bL]ln(G(0, ˜ mH)) ≤
v(Y − αc) + [αbH + (1 − α)bL]ln(Gmax)
30Adding (1 − α)bH lnGmax to each side, and substituting the above expression, we have:
(1 − α˜ mH)v(Y ) + α˜ mHv(Y − c) + [αbH + (1 − α)bL]ln(G(0, ˜ mH))
+ (1 − α)bH lnGmax ≤
(1 − ˜ mH)v(Y ) + ˜ mHv(Y − c) + bH ln(G(0, ˜ mH)) − Ω + (1 − α)bL ln(Gmax)
Simplifying and rearranging,




But the left hand side of this expression must be strictly positive for any m ≥ 0, a
contradiction. Thus, U
gov
M (˜ mH) > U
gov
T .
To show that UH
M(˜ mH) < UH
T does not necessarily imply U
gov
M (˜ mH) < U
gov
T , the same
exercise can be repeated with UH
M(˜ mH)+Φ = UH
T , Φ > 0. This shows that UH
M(˜ mH) < UH
T
does not imply U
gov
M (˜ mH) < U
gov
T , for Φ suﬃciently small. Since ˜ mgov > ˜ mH from
Lemma 3, this result also shows that it is possible to have U
gov




M(˜ mH) < UH
T .
Lemma 5: The proof is analogous to that of Lemma 4. Setting U
gov
M (m) = U
gov
T + Ψ,
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Figure 1: Best Responses: R(m) > 0 means ˆ H is the best response of type H to ˆ H ˆ L;
S(m) > 0 means ˆ H is the best response of type H to ˆ Lˆ L. This ﬁgure is drawn using the



































































Figure 4: Example 5, High types in the majority.
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